Morphing Attack Detection -- Database, Evaluation Platform and
  Benchmarking by Raja, Kiran et al.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 1
Morphing Attack Detection - Database,
Evaluation Platform and Benchmarking
Kiran Raja∗, Matteo Ferrara†, Annalisa Franco†, Luuk Spreeuwers‡, Illias Batskos‡, Florens de Wit‡, Marta
Gomez-Barrero∗∗, Ulrich Scherhag∗∗, Daniel Fischer∗∗, Sushma Venkatesh∗, Jag Mohan Singh∗,
Guoqiang Li∗, Loı¨c Bergeron∗, Sergey Isadskiy∗∗, Raghavendra Ramachandra∗, Christian Rathgeb∗∗,
Dinusha Frings§, Uwe Seidel††, Fons Knopjes§, Raymond Veldhuis‡, Davide Maltoni†, Christoph Busch∗
∗NTNU, Norway, †UBO, Italy, ‡UTW,The Netherlands,∗∗HDA, Germany, §NOI, The Netherlands, ††BKA, Germany
Abstract—Morphing attacks have posed a severe threat to Face Recognition System (FRS). Despite the number of advancements
reported in recent works, we note serious open issues that are not addressed. Morphing Attack Detection (MAD) algorithms often
are prone to generalization challenges as they are database dependent. The existing databases, mostly of semi-public nature, lack in
diversity in terms of ethnicity, various morphing process and post-processing pipelines. Further, they do not reflect a realistic operational
scenario for Automated Border Control (ABC) and do not provide a basis to test MAD on unseen data, in order to benchmark the
robustness of algorithms. In this work, we present a new sequestered dataset for facilitating the advancements of MAD where the
algorithms can be tested on unseen data in an effort to better generalize. The newly constructed dataset consists of facial images from
150 subjects from various ethnicities, age-groups and both genders. In order to challenge the existing MAD algorithms, the morphed
images are with careful subject pre-selection created from the subjects, and further post-processed to remove the morphing artifacts.
The images are also printed and scanned to remove all digital cues and to simulate a realistic challenge for MAD algorithms. Further,
we present a new online evaluation platform to test algorithms on sequestered data. With the platform we can benchmark the morph
detection performance and study the generalization ability. This work also presents a detailed analysis on various subsets of sequestered
data and outlines open challenges for future directions in MAD research.
Index Terms—Biometrics, Morphing Attack Detection, Face Recognition, Vulnerability of Biometric Systems
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1 INTRODUCTION
MORPHING attacks pose threats to Face RecognitionSystems (FRS) by exploiting the tolerance towards
intra-subject variations. Such attacks constitute a vulner-
ability in various applications like identity management,
identity verified border crossing and visa management [1].
Morphing attacks consists of generating a composite image
of two subjects resembling closely (for instance similar age
and same ethnicity) and using the composite image to verify
both the subject pairs pass. The composite image, hereafter
referred as Morphed Image should be of sufficient quality to
obtain a score above the threshold recommended by a FRS
in an automated face comparison system. It should also be
of sufficiently high quality to fool a trained border guard
when inspected manually [1].
The morphed image can for instance be obtained by
a malicious actor by colluding with a person having no
criminal record to mask the identity of the malicious actor
himself/herself, in order to obtain a new passport. When
a malicious actor is granted a valid identity document,
he/she can use it for various purposes posing a risk to
national security in the worst possible scenarios. With such
an assertion, the initial work demonstrating the morphing
attacks illustrated that commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) FRS
could be defeated with a given set of morphed images
[1]. That study further assessed if morphing attacks would
succeed when presented to the border guards. This means
The following paper is a pre-print. The publication is currently under review
for IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (TIFS).
morphing attacks pose a threat to FRS systems and leave a
major security risk to any nation where the malicious actor
enters.
Initial studies have investigated various aspects of the
morphing attacks starting from analysing the vulnerability
of FRS in detail [2], [3], [4], [5] to providing measures
to detect and mitigate the attacks effectively [2], [6], [7],
[8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. Further, a number of works have
focused on studying various parameters influencing the
decisions of morphing attack detection subsystems, while
other works have focused on providing the set of metrics to
gauge the strengths of Morphing Attack Detection (MAD)
mechanisms. The works have also noted the vulnerability
of morphing attacks on FRS using the digital images and re-
digitized images (digitally captured image which is printed
and scanned to re-digitize). In pursuit of the current State Of
The Art (SOTA) in MAD, we first review the related works
in the next section.
2 RELATED WORKS IN MORPHING ATTACKS ON
FRS AND DATABASES
Morphing attacks can be conducted in two specific
types in a broader sense - (i) morphing attacks using dig-
ital images (ii) morphing attacks using re-digitized images
(a.k.a. printed-and-scanned images). The former domain is
inspired by the practices of various countries which allow to
upload a digital representation of the face image for various
applications such as passport renewal in UK [21] and visa
application in New Zealand [22]. The latter is used in many
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Digital (D)/ Database Mode
Work Morphing Method Re-digitized(R) (# Morphed images) Detection Approach (see Section 2.3)
(Print-and-Scan)
Ferrara et al. (2014) [1]* GIMP GAP D 12 - -
Ferrara et al. (2016) [13]* GIMP GAP D 21 - -
Raghavendra et al. (2016) [2]* GIMP GAP D 450 Texture + Classifier S-MAD
Scherhag et al. (2017) [4] GIMP GAP D & R 231 Texture + Classifier S-MAD
Raghavendra et al. (2017) [14]* GIMP GAP D & R 1423 (×2) Texture + Classifier S-MAD
Raghavendra et al.(2017) [3]* GIMP GAP D & R 362 Deep-CNN S-MAD
Gomez-Barrero et al. (2017) [5]* - D 840 - S-MAD
Ferrara et al. (2018) [15] Sqirlz Morph 2.1 D & R 100 Demorphing D-MAD
Damer et al. (2018) [7] GAN D 1000 GAN Based Detection S-MAD
Raghavendra et al. (2018) [16] GIMP-GAP D & R 2518 Color Space Texture + Classifier S-MAD
Scherhag et al. (2019) [11]* OpenCV/dlib, D & R 964 (×3) PRNU + Classifier S-MAD
FaceFusion and FaceMorpher
Ferrara et al. (2019) [17] Sqirlz Morph 2.1 D & R 100 Deep Neural Networks D-MAD
Ferrara et al. (2019) [18]* Triangulation with Dlib-landmarks D 560 (×36) - -
Scherhag et al. (2020) [19] OpenCV/dlib, FaceFusion,u D & R 791+3246 (×3) Deep Features D-MAD
FaceMorpher and UBO Morpher
Venkatesh et al. (2020) [20]* StyleGAN D 2500 - S-MAD
TABLE 1: State of the art in Morphing Attack Databases and Vulnerability Reporting (* indicates vulnerability demonstrated
using COTS FRS)
countries where the passport/visa/identity-card applicant
is requested to provide an image such as in India [23] and
in most European countries (e.g. in The Netherlands [24])
and this leaves the opportunity for a malicious actor to
morph the facial image and print it. The image submitted
by the applicant is thereafter re-digitized for digital pro-
cessing and biometric enrolment. The earlier works have
considered both scenarios and studied the impact of both
types of attacks [1], [3], [4], [5]. In this section, we review
the key aspects of earlier works in both domains. While the
literature is extensive in the recent years, we scope the focus
of this work to most relevant works with new databases for
MAD. The reader is further referred to Scherhag et al. [6] for
a detailed survey of the literature.
2.1 Morphing Attacks Using Digital Images
The first work illustrating morphing attacks was re-
ported in 2014 by Ferrara et al. [1] where a set of morphed
images was created using the AR Face Database [25]. 5
pairs of images were morphed for male subjects and 5
pair of female subjects for studying the vulnerability of
FRS [1]. Further, to supplement the study, one morphed
image constituted by one male and one female subject
and another morphed image constituted by 3 male subjects
was employed. The studies specifically investigated the
vulnerability of two commercial FRS - Neurotech VeriLook
SDK 5.4 [26] and Luxand SDK 4.0 [27]. The initial studies
asserted the success of all morphed images in reaching
a match for both constituent subjects probe images and
thereby illustrating the vulnerability of face recognition
systems. In the following work by Raghavendra et al. [2], the
authors investigated the vulnerability on a larger set of grey
scale images with 450 morphed samples from 110 different
subjects on the Neurotech Verilook SDK [26]. In the same
work, the authors also proposed a first detection approach
suitable for morphed images that are processed only in
the digital domain. Further, Scherhag et al. [4] conducted
a similar analysis on using both a commercial SDK and
OpenFace SDK - an open source face recognition SDK.
In yet another work, Raghavendra et al. [3] employed a
total of 431 morphed images to evaluate MAD mechanisms
using deep neural networks. In a complementary work,
Gomez-Barrero et al. [5] investigated the vulnerability of
FRS to morphing attacks using 840 images from Multimodal
BioSecure Database [28] in the digital domain and also
investigated the vulnerability of fingerprint and iris bio-
metric systems against biometric attacks. As an alternative
to morphing approaches, Raghavendra et al. [14] presented
another concept of averaging facial images and proved the
vulnerability of FRS for morphed and averaged images in
the digital domain. The vulnerability was reported again
using the Neurotech Verilook SDK on a newly created
database of 580 morphed images and 580 averaged images.
In a different paradigm, Damer et al. [7] presented an
approach of generating morphed images using Generative
Adversarial Networks (GAN) on a set of 1500 images to
create 1000 morphed images. The authors compared the
results of MAD mechanism against traditional Land Mark
Aligned (LMA) morphing approaches, the vulnerability of
the generated database was reported using two open source
face SDKs based on VGG Network [29] and OpenFace [30].
The database was used to devise MAD mechanisms on
digital images alone in following works [8], [9], [10], [11],
[12].
2.2 Morphing Attacks Using Print and Scanned Images
Motivated by threats of morphed images to FRS, a num-
ber of works have also investigated morphing attacks using
re-digitized images (printed and scanned). The key assertion
behind these works is that the loss of pixel level information,
which was originally introduced by the morphing process,
and is now lost due to subsequent printing and scanning
processes using devices of various vendors decreases the
MAD capability. Further the printing and scanning pro-
cesses cause additional noise artifacts contained in the re-
digitized morphed images [4], [14], [15], [16], [31]
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Fig. 1: An illustration of the D-MAD pipeline
The works in detecting re-digitized images employ the
same techniques to generate morphs and then print-and-
scan them. Raghavendra et al. [14] introduced a print and
scanned database of 1423 morphed images using both mor-
phing and averaging of pixels. The images were printed
using a RICOH MPC 6003 SP on high-quality photo paper
with 300 g/m2 density and scanned using a HP Photos-
mart 5520 scanner at 300 dpi for bona fide, morphed and
averaged images. The work also illustrated the vulnera-
bility of COTS FRS with regards to re-digitized images to
be equal to digital domain images while the MAD per-
formance dropped. The same work was further extended
with a database to have 2518 morphed images [16]. In a
similar direction, Scherhag et al. [11], introduced a printed-
scanned morphed face image database generated using the
FRGCv2 face dataset. The authors used the Epson DS-
50000 Scanner at 300 dpi to print and scan the morphed
images generated using three different morphing schemes
(OpenCV/dlib, FaceFusion and FaceMorpher) [11]. Ferrara
et al. [15] also introduced a printed-scanned database for
MAD, specifically to study the demorphing approach where
the authors subtract the re-digitized images to detect a face
morphing attack. The morphed images were printed and
scanned at 600 dpi using a professional quality photoprinter
[15].
2.3 Classification of MAD
While the aforementioned works have employed various
databases, most of the works have also reported MAD
mechanisms correspondingly to mitigate the threats on FRS.
The algorithms for MAD can be classified in two classes:
• Differential-image MAD (D-MAD): A suspected morph
image is compared against an image captured in a trusted
environment (e.g., ABC gate) to determine if the suspected
image is morphed.
• Single-image MAD (S-MAD): A suspected morph image
is investigated (e.g. in a forensic process), in order to de-
termine if the image itself is morphed without using any
prior information or another reference image (captured
under a trusted acquisition scenario).
We provide a brief review of the relevant algorithms re-
ported in the recent works for both S-MAD and D-MAD.
2.3.1 Differential-image MAD
The general principle behind the D-MAD algorithms
relies on the idea that given a suspected morphed image, Is
and a reference image It captured in a trusted environment,
the difference between Is and It is obtained. The lower the
difference, either in the image space or feature space, the
larger the probability that the suspected image is accepted
as non-morphed (or bona fide image). The first approach
of D-MAD was based on inverting the morphing process
in a reverse engineered manner which was termed as De-
morphing [15]. In a similar manner, a number of works have
been reported where the difference of feature vectors from
the bona fide image and from the morph image is used to
determine if the suspected image is morphed [19], [32]. The
deep features from two different networks are employed
to determine the difference in features in [19], and features
from the 3D shape and the diffuse reflectance component
estimated directly from the image was employed to detect
a morphing attack in [32]. Another set of works explored
the shift in landmarks of bona fide and suspected morph
images in face region to determine the morphing attack [10],
[11]. For the sake of simplicity a generic illustration of the
D-MAD working principle is presented in Figure 1.
2.3.2 Single-image MAD
S-MAD algorithms largely rely on learning a classifier
to distinguish the bona fide image from a morphed image.
Given a suspected morph image, Is, the texture information
is extracted from the normalized and aligned face. The
texture features such as Binarized Statistical Image Features
(BSIF) and Local Binary Patterns (LBP) are used to classify
the images using a pre-trained SVM classifer [4], [14], [16]
in the earlier works. In a very similar direction, the LBP
features were also explored in [11], [33]. While extending
the works for MAD, another approach was proposed to
exploit the colour spaces and the scale spaces jointly [16],
[34]. With the intent to address and detect also the post-
processed morphed images, pre-trained deep networks for
extraction of texture features were employed to detect the
morphing attacks not only in the digital domain, but also
in re-digitized domain (print-scan) [3]. Notably, the earlier
works have employed two deep neural networks including
VGG19 [29] and AlexNet [35], where they perform feature
level fusion of the first fully connected layers from both
the networks [3]. In a continued effort, other deep networks
have been investigated for detecting morph attacks [17]. An-
other approach to detecting morphing attacks was proposed
by extracting the features from the “Photo Response Non-
Uniformity“ where the characteristics of the image sensor
were employed to determine, if the image was morphed
or not [12]. Motivated by the effectiveness of the noise
modelling, newer algorithms have been reported where
the color space has been investigated to seek for residuals
of the morphing process [36] including dedicated context
aggregation networks to automatically model the noise [37].
2.4 Limitations
As noted from the set of works listed in the previous
section and Table 1, there is a need for standardized and
reproducible testing of MAD mechanisms. The limitations
can be further divided in four main categories:
• Need for cross-dataset evaluation: As different works
have used in-house datasets generated using different
approaches, the proposed methods are only evaluated
on limited sets. Despite the proposed MAD approaches
performing very well on the in-house datasets, no works
have attempted to study the generalizable detection per-
formance except in recent works [33], [37] which attempts
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to study the cross-dataset evaluation. The missing aspect
from different studies suffer from validation of SOTA
proposed approaches in terms of generalizable detection
performance and also indicating the directions for future
works. To address this aspect is necessary to avoid the
classical over-fitting problem for MAD mechanisms.
• Need for sequestered database: Further to support the
reporting of generalizable detection performance in stud-
ies, there is a need for sequestered data for testing the
robustness of the MAD algorithms. Thus, the need for
a sequestered dataset, to which researchers do not have
access for training purposes, is obvious. Sequestered data
should solely be used for reproducible testing. Such tests
on unknown data will establish a reliable benchmark of
algorithms and will indicate, whether said algorithms are
robust to handle various factors unaware to researchers.
• Need for independent evaluation: As a third factor,
MAD algorithms are often tuned to perform well on
known datasets owing to the nature of in-house datasets.
Despite the datasets being divided in training, testing
and validation sets, it can be well observed that the
algorithms and researchers have full access to look at
the cases during an introspection and thereby improve
their own MAD detection performance iteratively. While
this enables continuous development and impovement of
algorithms, morphing attacks in a real-life border crossing
scenario can be compared to biometrics in the wild, where
neither morphing generation algorithms, nor the post-
processing approaches or printing and scanning mecha-
nisms can be fully controlled. For the algorithms to be
ready for operational deployment, there is a need for
independent testing using morphed images which are
unknown to the developers.
• Need for evaluation platform: While independent test-
ing is desired, there are not many organizations hosting
such platforms limiting the researchers to devise robust
algorithms. Although a similar evaluation effort is carried
out by NIST [38], the NIST FRVT MORPH dataset, es-
pecially the subset containing post-processed print-scan
and operational ABC gate images, is currently limited
in size. Therefore, the need for an independent evalua-
tion platform that runs continuously is needed to facili-
tate algorithmic evaluation and benchmark the detection
performance against other competing algorithms in the
lines of earlier evaluation platforms from University of
Bologna, who have provided a long-standing fingerprint
evaluation system [39], [40].
2.5 Contributions of this work
In order to address these four key limitations, in this
work we provide three major contributions followed by the
benchmarking of SOTA MAD mechanisms.
• A large scale sequestered database of morphed and bona
fide images collected in three different sites constituting
to 1800 photographs of 150 subjects is released along with
this article. The database covers various age groups, equal
representation of genders and varied ethnicity making
it an unique database for MAD algorithm evaluation.
The morphing of images was conducted with 6 differ-
ent morphing algorithms presenting a wide variety of
possible approaches. The images in the database consist
of 5,748 morphed face images, where subsets consist
of: (1) morphed images without post-processing to re-
move digital artifacts, (2) morphed and post-processed
images to remove artifacts induced while morphing to
produce passport quality ICAO photos [41], (3) printed
and scanned versions of ICAO standard passport images
using different combinations of printers and scanners
including the scanners used in federal ID management
offices in Europe. The database is accessible through the
FVConGoing platform [40] to allow third parties for eval-
uation and benchmarking.
• An unbiased and independent evaluation of 10 state
of the art MAD algorithms (6 D-MAD and 4 S-MAD)
against 5,748 morphed face images and 1,396 bona fide
face images. A total of 500,200 attempts with bona fide
(69,800) and morphed (430,400) face images are evaluated
to report the detection performance of current SOTA MAD
mechanisms.
• A new and independent evaluation platform is further
presented to facilitate reproducible research where any
researcher, governmental agency or private entity can
upload SDKs and measure the performance of their MAD
algorithm. The platform provides the benchmarking of the
MAD performance against all previously submitted algo-
rithms and specifically provides the results for different
subsets corresponding to age, gender or ethnicity. Such
detailed analysis will enable the researchers to identify
the performance limitations of MAD mechanisms and
facilitate them to develop more robust algorithms.
In the remainder of this article, in Section 3 we present
the newly composed database where the details of the entire
dataset are described. The new independent evaluation plat-
form is introduced in Section 4. In Section 5, we present the
set of SOTA algorithms that are particularly evaluated on
the sequestered dataset. A detailed discussion of results and
the analysis of MAD performance is reported in Section 6.
While in Section 7 we draw the conclusions and list current
limitations with the intention, to facilitate the efforts for
development of future algorithms.
Digital Printed-Scanned
Bona fide enrolment 300 1096
Morphed enrolment 2045 3703
Gate (Trusted live capture) 1500 -
TABLE 2: Number of images in the database.
3 SOTAMD DATABASE
As noted in the earlier works, the existing MAD ef-
forts by research institutions are largely based on internally
created databases, which often are limited in size, diver-
sity of image capture devices, image quality, realistic post-
processing, and variability of morphing algorithms. We note
that a best practice of using different databases and im-
age acquisition and testing protocols makes it challenging,
to benchmark MAD algorithms and thereby makes it for
an operator next to impossible to judge the applicability
of current MAD for operational deployment. In order to
overcome these limitations and provide a new dataset for
benchmarking (both for S-MAD and D-MAD algorithms)
under realistic conditions with high quality images, we
created a new dataset, to which we refer as State of the
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Art Morphing Detection (SOTAMD) dataset. The dataset
consists of:
1) Enrolment images: bona fide face images taken in a
capture set-up, which is meeting the requirements of
passport application photo capture (e.g., photographer
studio).
2) Gate images: bona fide face images captured live with
a face capture system in an Automated Border Control
(ABC) gate.
3) Chip images: compressed face images stored on an elec-
tronic Machine Readable Travel Document (e-MRTD).
4) Morphed face images: morphed images created from
the pool of passport face images. The database contains
different kinds of morphed images as listed below:
a) Digital morphed images: Images obtained obtained
directly after morphing in the digital domain.
b) Digital post-processed morphed images: morphed
images that are processed (automatically or manually)
in the digital domain, to eliminate or hide the artifacts
resulting from a morphing process.
c) Print-scanned morphed images: post-processed mor-
phed images that are printed and scanned to simulate
the passport application process.
A number of factors are considered in creating this
dataset as a joint effort in an EU funded project - State-
Of-The-Art-Morphing-Detection (SOTAMD) which are ex-
plained in the subsequent sections.
The database images (see Table 2) are used to test S-MAD
and D-MAD algorithms according to the testing protocols
defined in Section 4.2.
Gender Age
Male Female A18-A35 A36-A55 A56-A75
86 64 87 47 16
Ethnicity
European African India-Asian East-Asian Middle-Eastern
96 26 10 9 9
TABLE 3: Demographics of the SOTAMD database
Automated
Morphing
Manually
post-
processed
Total
Digital
images 1475 570 2045
Printed &
Scanned 1453 2250 3703
Total 2928 2820 5748
TABLE 4: Total number of images with morphing and
manual post-processing.
3.1 Subject Pre-selection
An important aspect of creating a successful morph
attack is subject selection, such that closely resembling pairs
of faces are chosen [4]. Following the guidelines of earlier
works, the SOTAMD database was created by selecting
the morph pairing candidates with high similarity with
careful considerations to age, gender and ethnicity. As an
additional measure, the selected morph pairing candidates
were also validated by observing the comparison scores
from two specific commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) FRS -
Neurotech Verilook SDK [26] and Cognitec FaceVacs SDK
[50]. All the morphed images that did not verify against
probe images from both contributing subjects were classified
as low quality morph set in the final database. This labeling
makes the SOTAMD database highly relevant to investigate
low quality and high quality morph detection capability.
Such elimination and careful selection has led to 75 unique
pairs of candidates for morphing from a total of 150 individ-
uals of various ethnicity and age group. The subjects were
selected amongst university staff and student corpus, and a
casting agency website. Table 3 presents the gender, age and
ethnicity demographics of the selected subjects for the final
SOTAMD database.
3.2 Bona Fide enrolment images
For each of the 150 subjects in the SOTAMD database,
two enrolment images were captured in high quality studio
acquisition set-up reflecting the real-life passport photo
capture process. Further, the enrolment images are also
printed and scanned to have both digital and correspond-
ingly printed and scanned subsets. The print and scan
processes are conducted using various printers and scanners
to increase the diversity of the dataset.
Given the nature of this work reflecting a operational border
control scenario, we have exercised care to make sure the
images are ICAO complaint [41]. Thus, each of the images
in the enrolment set was processed with professional soft-
ware to comply with ICAO standards for eMRTD images.
The processed images were further used for printing and
scanning to closely follow the actual production scenario of
passports based on the regulations in the Netherlands and
Germany under EU member state regulations.
The number of bona fide enrolment images in the new
SOTAMD database is 300 in digital format, and 1096 printed
and scanned.
(a) Bona fide
face image
(Criminal)
(b) Morphed
face image
with alpha
factor = 0.5
(c) Morphed
face image
with alpha
factor = 0.3
(d) Bona fide
face image
(Accomplice)
Fig. 2: Impact of morphing factors (α) on morphing.
3.3 Morphed enrolment images
To simulate the criminal attack, we generated a number
of morphed images to be used for enrolment, i.e. to be
hypothetically presented to the officer during passport the
application process. The morphed images have been created
starting from the bona fide enrolment images (one for each
subject).
Unlike the noted previous works in Table 1, the newly
created morphed set in the SOTAMD database has a wide
variation of employed morphing processes. Specifically, the
morphing set consists of an unprocessed image set and
fully-processed image set. To increase the challenging nature
of the dataset and in order to simulate realistic data, the
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(a) Both automatically and
manually post-processed
digital morphed face image
(b) Image 3(a) but printed,
scanned and compressed
Fig. 3: Illustration of post-processing - Careful processing
to remove the artifacts can be noted in the eyelids, iris
and nostril regions to eliminate the traces of the morphing
process. Refer Figure 4 for detailed illustration.
post-processed images are printed and scanned using differ-
ent pipelines. To further increase the diversity, each image
pair was morphed using contributing factors (referred as
alpha factor) of 0.3 and 0.5 for each of the two contributing
faces. Examples of two morphed face images are shown in
Figure 2. Furthermore, the processed images are resized us-
ing the OpenCV library [51] to maintain the same inter-eye
distance distribution as observed in the morphed images to
avoid any possibility of inferring the image class from it’s
dimensions. Post-processing methods consist of automatic
and/or manual methods to conceal visible, and sometimes
easy to detect morphing traces. Due to such variation in
algorithms, any MAD algorithm that can achieve signifi-
cant accuracy of detection on the SOTAMD dataset can be
deemed as robust. Examples of automatically and manually
post-processed digital morphed face image (left), and the
same image after printing and scanning (right) are shown in
Figure 3.
Examples of a morphed face image, before (left) and after
(a) Before (b) After
Fig. 4: Morphed face image before and after manual Post-
processing from Figure 3. Only the central part of the face
is reported to better appreciate the effect of artifact removal.
Careful processing to remove the artifacts can be noted in
the eyelids, iris and nostril regions to eliminate the traces of
morphing process.
(right) manual post-processing are shown in Figure 4. Mor-
phed face images that were both automatically and manu-
ally post-processed compose the most challenging subset.
All the enrolment face images (bona fide and morphed)
were processed with ICAO compliance [41] testing software
before entering into the database. An overview of the basic
subsets of morphed face images is shown in Table 4.
A detailed account of the morphing methods that were
contributed by each partner can be seen in Table 5 which
provides the various approaches used for automated and
manual post-processing pipelines.
A subset of the generated morphed images has been printed
and scanned using multiple pipelines (in analogy with
the bona fide enrolment images); the number of morphed
images in the database is therefore 2045 in digital format
and 3703 printed and scanned.
3.4 Gate images
The SOTAMD database contains 10 gate images captured
from each subject (overall 1500 images) during a single
acquisition session at different locations under a simulated
Partner Algorithm description Automated Manual
Post-processing method Post-processing method
Hochschule Darmstadt FaceMorpher [42] Facemorpher’s internal No Manual
post-processing +sharpening Post-processing
Hochschule Darmstadt FaceFusion [43] FaceFusion’s internal GIMP
(only used by HDA) post-processing+sharpening retouching [44]
Norwegian University of FaceMorph The replacement of the eyeregion GIMP
Science and Technology (OpenCV with Dlib) [45] is performed in post-processing, retouching [44]
to prevent a double iris.
Norwegian University of FantaMorph [46] Fantamorph’s Adobe Photoshop
Science and Technology (only used byNTN) internal processing Retouching [47]
University of Bologna Triangulation with Background replacement,edge Adobe Photoshop
Dlib-landmarks suppression, colour equalization Retouching [47]
University of Twente Triangulation with Background replacement, GIMP
STASM-landmarks [48] Poisson image editing [49] retouching [44]
University of Bologna Triangulation with Background replacement GIMP
NT-landmarks edge suppression, colour equalization retouching [44]
TABLE 5: Contributed morphing methods, manual post-processing methods and automated post-processing methods.
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ABC gate operational scenario 1.
As an additional measure, the quality of the images cap-
tured in the emulate ABC set-up was validated by reading
the corresponding eMRTD chip images and verifying them
against the captured gate image using COTS FRS.
The gate images were captured at two different partner
facilities (Norwegian University of Science and Technology
- referred to as NTN and Hochschule Darmstadt - referred
to as HDA) from 100 subjects that directly corresponds to
real ABC gates from two different vendors. These probe im-
ages that are generated from two different vendors capture
devices, represent images that are used in real operational
settings. Another set (from University of Twente - referred
to as UTW) of gate images from 50 subjects are captured
with a simulated custom-built mock ABC gate 2. Thus, given
three different set-ups of ABC gates, the probe-set provides
a variation for benchmarking different MAD algorithms,
which demands an agnostic nature and robustness of the
algorithms. Examples of the different probe images captured
from different set-up are illustrated in Figure 5.
(a) Mock ABC gate
(UTW)
(b) ABC gate
(HDA)
(c) IDEMIA’s
MFace gate (NTN)
Fig. 5: Examples of probe face images captured from differ-
ent ABC set-up.
4 EVALUATION PLATFORM
We further present a new independent evaluation frame-
work to measure the robustness of MAD. The MAD bench-
marks have been realized following the testing framework
of FVC-onGoing [39], [40] and a web-based automated eval-
uation platform has been designed to track the advances in
MAD, through continuously updated independent testing
and reporting of performances on given benchmarks. FVC-
onGoing benchmarks are grouped into benchmark areas
according to the (sub)problem addressed and the evaluation
protocol adopted (e.g. Fingerprint Verification, Palmprint
Verification, Face Image ISO Compliance Verification, etc.).
To maximize trustworthiness of the results, tests are carried
out using a strongly supervised approach on a collection
of sequestered datasets and results are reported on-line by
using well known performance indicators and metrics. We
follow the same design principles to evaluate the MAD
algorithms in this work.
1. Due to operational concerns not to interfere border control pro-
cesses the images were not acquired with operational ABC gates at
airport locations. Instead, HDA and NTN used a mock ABC gate setup
provided by an ABC manufacturer, whereas UTW created a mock ABC
gate setup.
2. The probe images from the mock-set-up were cropped to around
60% of the original 1080x1920 size to remove background clutter and
faces were aligned to eliminate pose challenges and then finally resized
to 615x855.
The evaluation process is fully automated as illustrated
in Figure 6 which consists of participant registration, al-
gorithm submission, performance evaluation, and results
visualization. To protect sensitive information (biometric
data) and to prevent external attacks, the FVC-onGoing
framework is composed of two different modules physically
located in two separate servers:
• The Front-End server containing the web site and the
algorithm repository.
• The Test Engine server containing the test engine and the
benchmark datasets.
A firewall protects the Test Engine server by blocking all
inbound and outbound connections on public and private
networks. Only a few authorized users can access the Test
Engine server from a specific terminal using a protected
local connection. Moreover, to avoid undesirable behaviour
of the submitted algorithms, all of them are first analysed
by antivirus software and then executed in a strongly con-
trolled environment with minimal permissions.
Algorithms can be provided in the form of i) a Win32
console application or ii) a Linux dynamically-linked library
compliant to NIST FRVT MORPH specifications [38].
Two different benchmark areas (D-MAD and S-MAD)
have been created to evaluate the accuracy of MAD algo-
rithms in the differential- and single-image scenarios. Table
6 provides detailed information on the benchmarks con-
tained in the two benchmark areas. Algorithms submitted to
these benchmarks must comply to specific protocols, whose
details are given on the FVC-onGoing web site [40].
4.1 Detection performance evaluation
The evaluation platform is designed to report a number
of performance metrics for MAD algorithms as detailed in
this section. For each experiment bona fide and morphed
face images are used to compute the Bona fide Presentation
Classification Error Rate (BPCER) and the Attack Presenta-
tion Classification Error Rate (APCER). As defined in [52]
the BPCER is the percentage of bona fide presentations
falsely classified as morphing presentation attacks while the
APCER is the proportion of morphing attack presentations
falsely classified as bona fide presentations. The following
performance indicators are reported:
• EER (detection Equal-Error-Rate): the error rate for which
BPCER and APCER are identical
• BPCER10: the lowest BPCER for APCER≤10%
• BPCER20: the lowest BPCER for APCER≤5%
• BPCER100: the lowest BPCER for APCER≤1%
• REJNBFRA: Number of bona fide face images that cannot be
processed
• REJNMRA: Number of morphed face images that cannot be
processed
• Bona fide and Morph detection score distributions
• APCER(t)/BPCER(t) curves, where t is the detection
threshold
• DET(t) curve (the plot of BPCER against APCER)
4.2 Protocols for Evaluation
In order to benchmark the MAD algorithms, we defined
two specific protocols for D-MAD and S-MAD respectively:
• D-MAD: in this case, the algorithms receive as input a
pair of images (an enrolment image and a gate image) and
are requested to estimate the probability that the image is
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Fig. 6: The figure shows the architecture of the FVC-onGoing evaluation framework and an example of a typical workflow:
a given participant, after registering to the Web Site (1), submits some algorithms (2) to one or more of the available
benchmarks; the algorithms (binary executable programs compliant to a given protocol) are stored in a specific repository
(3). Each algorithm is evaluated by the Test Engine that, after some preliminary checks (4), executes it on the dataset of the
corresponding benchmark (5) and processes its outputs (e.g. comparison scores) to generate (6) all the results (e.g. EER,
score graphs, . . . ), which are finally published (7) on the Web Site.
morphed, based on a differential analysis of the two input
images. The enrolment images available in the database
are thus compared against the gate images (i.e. trusted
live capture) according to the following protocol:
– Bona fide images: the bona fide enrolment image is
compared against the gate images of the same subject;
– Morphed images (factor 0.3): the morphed enrolment
image is compared against the gate images of the sub-
ject who contributed least in the morphing (the hidden
identity);
– Morphed images (factor 0.5): the morphed enrolment
image is compared against the gate images of both
contributing subjects.
• S-MAD: in this case, the algorithms receive as input a
single image and are requested to estimate the probability
that the image is morphed (i.e. to report a morphing
likelihood score). To this aim, the probe set consists of the
whole set of available enrolment images (bona fide and
morphed).
The resulting number of attempts for the two benchmarks
is provided in Table 6.
5 MAD ALGORITHMS
A number of existing state of the art MAD algorithms
are evaluated on the newly created SOTAMD database
using the new evaluation platform. Within the scope of this
work and the project, both D-MAD and S-MAD algorithms
have been submitted to the corresponding FVC-onGoing
benchmarks. In this section, we provide a brief description
of the algorithms that were tested on the newly developed
database and the evaluation platform.
5.1 D-MAD
A D-MAD algorithm uses additional information from
a second image known to be bona fide (e.g. a live image
captured in an ABC gate) to detect morphed face images.
D-MAD algorithms obtain the differences in images us-
ing textural features (textural features or deep features) or
landmark shifts. We present a set of D-MAD algorithms
evaluated on SOTMAD database in the subsequent sections.
5.1.1 BSIF
It is based on a set of texture features obtained using
the Binarized Statistical Independent Features (BSIF) with
a 8-bit filter of size 3x3, applied on the normalized and
aligned image. Given the histogram feature vector of the
dimension 1 × 4096 for hs and ht respectively, the differ-
ence is presented to a pre-tarined SVM classifier trained
on the bona fide and morphed data from FERET [53] and
FRGC [54] images. The approach also considers number of
post-processing steps such as median filtering, histogram
normalization and sharpness processing on the images be-
Benchmark
area
Benchmark Format Morphing factor Min. eye
distance
Max. eye
distance
Bona fide
attempts
Morph
attempts
D-MAD
D-MAD SOTAMD D 1.0 Digital 0.3 and 0.5 80 1020 3000 30550
D-MAD SOTAMD P&S 1.0 Printed & Scanned 0.3 and 0.5 80 360 10960 55530
S-MAD
S-MAD SOTAMD D 1.0 Digital 0.3 and 0.5 90 1020 300 2045
S-MAD SOTAMD P&S 1.0 Printed & Scanned 0.3 and 0.5 80 170 1096 3703
TABLE 6: D-MAD and S-MAD benchmarks
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fore training the SVM classifier for moprhs generated from
FaceMorpher and OpenCV.
5.1.2 DFR
It utilizes the information of the embeddings (feature
vectors) of the ArcFace algorithm [55], a ResNet based face
recognition system. The fundamental idea is to use the
feature vectors of the face-generating neural network to
train an SVM. Since the neural network does not encounter
morphed facial images during training, it can be excluded
that the feature extraction overfits to artifacts of certain mor-
phing algorithms, which in turn leads to a higher robustness
of the resulting MAD algorithm. The ArcFace feature vector
has a length of 512 features. The feature vectors of the e-gate
live capture and the suspected morph image are subtracted.
The resulting difference is used to train an SVM with RBF
kernel. The algorithm evaluated in this paper was trained
on the bona fide and morphed data from FERET [53] and
FRGC [54]. Details of the DFR MAD algorithm can be found
in [19].
5.1.3 MBLBP
It consists of pre-processing, calculation of multiple
block LBP from both Is and It followed by classifying them
as a bona fide image or morphed image using the pre-
trained SVM classifer [6]. The Dlib landmark detector is
used to detect the facial area and the landmarks with the
face in the pre-processing step where the face is realigned
and normalized to achieve ICAO compliance [?]. The nor-
malised face image is then cropped to the 320 × 320 pixel
wide region of from which the LBP information is extracted
using 4 × 4 equally sized blocks of the image. Within each
block, a window size of 5 × 5 pixels is employed to obtain
the histograms. Given the histogram of hs and ht for Is and
It respectively, a difference of hs and ht is obtained which
is given to the SVM classifier to obtain a final decision on
suspected image as morphed or bona fide image.
5.1.4 WL
This method is based the fact that facial landmarks are
usually averaged between two individuals when morphed
images are created. Therefore, the distance of a given land-
mark (e.g., right corner of the right eye) between two bona
fide images of the same subject will be smaller than the
distance between that same landmark from a bona fide
images of the subject and the morphed images with another
subject. To exploit this idea, a set of 68 facial landmarks is
extracted from each input image using dlib. Subsequently,
two types of features are computed: Euclidean distances
between landmarks, and angles between a pre-defined set
of neighbouring landmarks. In order to account for the reli-
ability of the landmarks estimation (e.g., the eye corners are
more stable than landmarks on the lips), different weights
are applied to the distances before they are classified as
bona fide or morphed images using an SVM. Details on the
computations of the distances and angles can be found in
[10], [56].
5.1.5 DR
This method is based on the differentiating the image
from bona fide image captured from trusted environment,
(e.g., ABC gate) and the suspected image from Machine-
Readable Travel Document (eMRTD) [32]. Both images Is
and It are decomposed into the normal maps, and diffuse
map using SfSNet [57] following which the diffuse recon-
structed image and a quantized normal map are obtained.
From the diffuse map, the features are extracted using
‘fc7’ activation layer of AlexNet [35]. The features from the
normal map are extracted by converting them to quantized
spherical angles (quantization is 24-bit). The features are
used to train polynomial SVM classifiers for each set of
features. The classifiers are used then used to determine if
the suspected image is morphed or not based on the fusion
of scores from each individual classifier corresponding to
normal map and diffuse map.
5.1.6 Face demorphing
The idea of Face Demorphing (FaDe) [15] involves in-
verting the morphing process in a reverse engineered man-
ner. Given a suspected image Is that is corresponding to
image stored in the ID document where Is is generally a
linear combination of multiple images. Im = Ia + Ic where
Ia and Ic are the face images of bona fide accomplice and
a criminal respectively. The assumption on the other end is
that for a genuine ID document (with no morphing attack)
the image Im is a combination of two identical images (for
e.g., Im = Ia + Ia), where Ia is the bona fide subject.
Given the captured image It in a trusted environment,
demorphing algorithm obtains a difference between the
suspected image Is and the captured image It to obtain a
demorphed image Id. When the Id is compared against the
It using a FRS system, a high comparison score (S) indicates
no morphing and lower score indicates higher probability of
morphing. Ferrara et al. [15] employ Dlib for comparing the
trusted capture image It and demorphed image Id as given
below:
S =

max
[
0,
(d− τ1)
(2× (τ2 − τ1))
]
, ifd ≤ τ2
max
[
1, 0.5 +
(d− τ2)
(2× (τ3 − τ2))
]
, otherwise.
(1)
where τ1, τ2, τ3 are thresholds chosen om empirical trials
set to 0.3699, 0.4565, 0.5469 respectively.
5.2 S-MAD
An S-MAD algorithm determines whether an image is
morphed directly i.e. without using a trusted reference im-
age. Most of the S-MAD algorithms first extract the features
from the suspected image using textural or deep networks,
followed by learning a classifier. The learnt classifier is used
to determine if the image is morphed or not. We briefly
describe the set of S-MAD algorithms evaluated in this
work.
5.2.1 PRNU
This algorithm is based on the analysis of Photo Re-
sponse Non-Uniformity (PRNU). In essence, the PRNU
stems from slight variations among individual pixels during
the photoelectric conversion in digital image sensors. As a
consequence, it is present in all acquired images and can
be considered as an inherent part of any sensor’s output.
In fact, the PRNU has been successfully used for different
forensic tasks, such as device identification or detection of
digital forgeries. For the particular purpose of detecting
morphed images [11], the PRNU is extracted from the
preprocessed facial images and subsequently split into cells.
From each cell, the variance of 100-bin histograms of the
PRNU is computed. Then, the minimum value among all
cells is thresholded to obtain a bona fide vs. morphed image
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decision. More details on this MAD mechanism can be
found in [11].
5.2.2 Scale-Space Ensemble Approach (SSE)
The algorithm is based on ensemble approach of extract-
ing textural features followed by learning a classifier [16].
With the set of scores obtained from different classifiers
learnt from different features, the final decision is made on
whether the image is bona fide or morphed. Specifically,
the image is decomposed in different color spaces such
as YCbCr and HSV space. For each channel of the color
space, the image is decomposed into different scale spaces
using a Laplacian pyramid with 3 level decomposition.
Further different textural features using Binarized Statistical
Independent Features (BSIF), Local Binary Patterns (LBP)
and Histogram of Gradients (HOG) are obtained. The ob-
tained features are further used to learn the Collaborative
Representative Classifier (CRC). While the testing is carried
out on the SOTAMD dataset, the training was performed on
a dataset derived from the FRGC face dataset. More details
can be found in [3].
5.2.3 Deep-S-MAD
This algorithm uses well-known pre-trained CNNs to
detect morphed images [17]. Pre-trained networks have
been fine tuned using a large set of artificially generated
digital images (both bona fide and morphed). Moreover, in
order to deal with the P&S process, a further fine tuning
step has been performed for the P&S case exploiting a
set of images artificially generated to simulate P&S. The
simulation follows a mathematical model that allows to
control different image characteristics, related to both image
visual quality and low-level signal content. In particular, the
main visual effects produced when an image is printed and
scanned can be successfully reproduced (blurring, gamma
correction, color adjustment or noise).
The AlexNet architecture pre-trained on ImageNet [35] has
been used on digital images while the VGG-Face16 [58]
architecture pre-trained on the VGG-Face dataset [58] has
been used on P&S images.
5.2.4 S-MBLBP
The created classification system extracts multi-block
local binary patterns from a face image and uses a support
vector machine with a linear kernel to classify it as either
morphed or bona fide. We optimize the feature extraction
process by using uniform LBPs with radius, r = 1 (i.e. num-
ber of neighbours, n = 8), and a histogram layout of 3x3. Be-
fore feature extraction the face is detected and cropped with
a HOG-based face detector [45], converted to grey scale and
finally histogram equalization is applied to enhance image
contrast. The 3x3 histogram layout is realized by splitting
the face image by 2 equidistant vertical and horizontal lines.
A single histogram contains 59 feature values, which means
that after concatenating the 9 histograms of our layout our
feature space has 531 dimensions. The classifier was trained
on [54] and [59]. As pre-processing steps, all training images
were converted to png format without any compression to
avoid jpg compression artefacts being detected, and resized
using nearest neighbour interpolation to the average size
of the three training datasets. Additionally, faces were hori-
zontally aligned to make them similar to (ICAO compliant)
benchmark images.
6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
6.1 Results - Differential Morph Attack Detection (D-
MAD)
The results observed in the Digital Image Benchmark (D-
MAD-SOTAMD D-1.0) are reported in Figure 7 (also Table 7
for the results on two subsets with morphing factor 0.3 and
0.5 respectively). In particular, Table 7 reports the detection
performance indicators for the overall set of images as well
as for the two subsets with morphing factor 0.3 and 0.5
respectively. The DET plots in Figure 7 refer to the overall
results.
Fig. 7: DET plots for the D-MAD-SOTAMD D-1.0.
The detection accuracy of some of the evaluated algo-
rithms is quite modest. Two algorithms perform better than
the average, and the algorithm DFR in particular reaches
very promising results. The reason for the general under-
performance of the MAD algorithms with respect to the
detection accuracy reported in the original publications
could be due to the difficulty of the benchmark and the
over-specialization of said algorithms on the native training
sets used previously in the research labs. As to the FaDe
approach, its better generalization capability is probably due
to the absence in the method of a specific training stage
and/or hyperparameters tuning. The good performance of
DFR can be attributed to the fact that the ArcFace algorithm
used for feature extraction was trained independently of
morphed images and thus the extracted feature vectors are
not overfitted to the artifacts of individual MAD algorithms.
Table 7 reports the performance of the tested MADs on the
entire set of images as well as separately for the subsets of
images with morphing factor 0.3 and 0.5. The results related
to the morphing factor 0.3 are in general slightly better
than those obtained on the entire database. A noticeable
improvement can only be observed on all the performance
indicators for DFR and FaDe algorithms. The behavior of
FaDe is explainable if we consider that the algorithm has
been designed to work on asymmetric morphings. The
performance gain of the DFR can be attributed to the use
of the difference vector. If the morphing factor is lower, the
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Test Bona fide
comparisons
Morphed
comparisons
Algorithm EER BPCER10 BPCER20 BPCER100 REJNBFRA REJNMRA
Overall 3000 30550
BSIF 45.93% 78.30% 84.13% 93.83% 1.53% 1.42%
DFR 4.54% 2.00% 3.93% 18.87% 1.67% 1.55%
MBLBP 33.47% 52.80% 59.93% 74.80% 2.80% 2.62%
WL 37.13% 71.67% 83.27% 95.67% 3.33% 3.16%
DR 52.03% 89.70% 94.70% 98.57% 0.00% 0.00%
FaDe 14.17% 17.20% 22.77% 64.57% 0.20% 0.19%
0.3 3000 10350
BSIF 46.43% 78.50% 85.23% 94.50% 1.53% 1.40%
DFR 1.96% 1.67% 1.67% 13.23% 1.67% 1.54%
MBLBP 31.57% 49.67% 56.47% 68.00% 2.80% 2.60%
WL 32.87% 63.90% 77.73% 93.97% 3.33% 3.07%
DR 52.60% 90.00% 94.77% 98.57% 0.00% 0.00%
FaDe 8.43% 7.27% 12.60% 27.47% 0.20% 0.17%
0.5 3000 20200
BSIF 45.70% 78.10% 83.53% 93.47% 1.53% 1.43%
DFR 5.40% 2.47% 5.60% 21.50% 1.67% 1.56%
MBLBP 34.33% 54.20% 61.93% 77.07% 2.80% 2.62%
WL 39.47% 74.47% 84.70% 96.40% 3.33% 3.20%
DR 51.74% 89.60% 94.63% 98.57% 0.00% 0.00%
FaDe 15.76% 20.07% 27.70% 100.00% 0.20% 0.19%
TABLE 7: Performance indicators measured on the subset of D-MAD-SOTAMD D-1.0 benchmark for the overall set of
images and for the subsets of images with morphing factor 0.3 and 0.5.
difference increases and so does the possibility to detect the
morph.
For a deeper comprehension of the main image charac-
teristics affecting to a larger extent the MAD performance,
the results have been analyzed for specific subsets of images,
described in Table 8. The subsets have been selected accord-
ing to the number of images available (too small subsets are
therefore discarded).
The degree of influence of each specific subset with
respect to the overall performance has been evaluated com-
puting, for each subset s, the percentage deviation between
the EER measured on the specific subset (eers) and the EER
measured on the whole set of images:
devs =
eers − eero
eero
× 100 (2)
A negative deviation indicates that the specific subset is
“easier” with respect to the overall set of images (a lower
EER value has been observed), high positive values identify
more difficult subsets. The deviation computed for each
algorithm, as well as the average deviation (devs) for the
subset of tests with morphing factor 0.3 are reported in Table
9 where the results are sorted by devs. Some interesting
results can be observed, in relation to the main attributes
characterizing the database images:
• Ethnicity: in general the morphed images produced with
Indian-Asian and Middle Eastern subjects are easier to
detect for most of the algorithms. The cardinality of these
subsets is lower than European/American, and the chance
of selecting lookalike subjects for morphing was lower.
• Post-processing: as expected manual retouching makes
morphing detection more difficult w.r.t. automatic post-
processing, even if the difference is just minor here.
• Manual post-processing: significant differences can be ob-
served in relation to the manual post-processing executor,
thus confirming the importance of manual retouching
aimed at removing small artefacts; while PM03 and PM06
are easier to detect, especially for some algorithms, PM02
and PM05 are more difficult to spot.
Attribute Attribute value
Gender
Female
Male
Ethnicity
African
East-Asian
European/American
Indian-Asian
Middle Eastern
Age
18..35
36..55
56..75
Traits
Freckles
Moles
None – no relevant facial traits
Partner
HDA
NTNU
UTW
Post-processing
Automatic – no manual retouching
Manual – with manual retouching
Morphing algorithm See Table 5
Manual post-processing See Table 5
Morph quality
Low – the morphed image is rejected
at face verification stage by at least
one FR SDK between Neurotechnol-
ogy and Cognitec
High – the morphed image is ac-
cepted at face verification stage by
both Neurotechnology and Cognitec
FR SDKs
TABLE 8: List of attributes and subsets used for performance
evaluation.
• Partner: the subset containing UTW images is overall more
difficult with respect to those of the other partners. In fact,
in this case, very similar pairs of subjects were selected
(see D3-3 Database description), making the resulting
morphs more difficult to be detected.
• Morph quality: as expected high quality morphs (i.e., those
accepted by commercial face verification algorithms) are
more difficult to detect than low quality morphs (i.e.,
those already rejected by face verification algorithms).
• Morphing algorithm: the results over different morphing
algorithms are quite different; algorithms C06, C07 and
C03 are generally easier to detect, while C02 and C01 are
quite hard for most of the D-MAD algorithms.
• Age: the results on subjects in the range 56-75 are generally
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Attribute Subset devs BSIF DFR MBLBP WL DR FaDe
Ethnicity Middle Eastern -31.36% -4.03% -100.00% -13.43% -30.36% 0.34% -40.69%
Ethnicity Indian-Asian -30.76% -20.87% -63.27% -26.96% -26.41% -6.39% -40.69%
Partner HDA -27.13% -6.53% -90.31% -46.02% -7.73% -2.83% -9.37%
Partner NTNU -21.30% -21.77% -54.08% -20.81% -3.86% 5.00% -32.27%
Age 18..35 -15.30% -4.26% -56.63% -11.15% -6.30% 1.73% -15.18%
Ethnicity East-Asian -13.41% 5.34% -100.00% -13.02% 18.59% 9.90% -1.30%
Traits None -9.65% -4.87% -31.63% -1.58% -4.29% 0.61% -16.13%
Morph quality Low -5.96% 3.17% -20.92% -3.61% -2.56% 0.40% -12.22%
Morph. algorithm C07 -5.76% 1.77% -16.84% -4.34% -0.67% -1.33% -13.17%
Morph. algorithm C06 -5.32% -7.60% 1.02% -9.98% -12.69% -1.83% -0.83%
Post-processing PM03 -4.58% 50.72% -27.04% -1.24% 11.90% -9.03% -52.79%
Morph. algorithm C03 -3.36% 12.69% -20.92% -4.91% 3.07% 0.23% -10.32%
Ethnicity European/Amer. -2.65% -0.58% 8.67% -7.63% 2.19% 1.50% -20.05%
Post-processing PM01 -1.82% -0.78% -9.69% 22.11% 7.45% -0.95% -29.06%
Gender Male -0.63% -2.54% 5.61% -2.41% 4.17% 2.28% -10.91%
Post-processing Automatic -0.60% 0.06% -0.51% -0.76% -1.64% 0.44% -1.19%
Morph. algorithm C05 -0.33% -0.54% 0.00% -0.13% 2.07% -0.76% -2.61%
Post-processing Manual 1.65% -0.45% 0.00% 2.06% 4.08% -1.10% 5.34%
Post-processing PM06 3.34% -42.32% 103.06% -39.66% -23.79% -3.00% 25.74%
Ethnicity African 4.36% 8.46% 15.82% 1.11% -5.84% -5.13% 11.74%
Post-processing PM02 6.50% -6.89% -5.61% 22.27% 10.34% 5.27% 13.64%
Morph. algorithm C02 6.84% -5.82% -7.14% 21.57% 10.50% 8.90% 13.05%
Gender Female 11.01% 1.68% 71.43% 5.64% -3.95% -4.81% -3.91%
Morph. algorithm C01 13.24% 0.60% 62.24% 1.55% 1.34% -1.14% 14.83%
Age 36..55 13.84% 9.93% 53.06% 19.70% 5.81% -2.64% -2.85%
Post-processing PM05 14.38% -2.00% 69.39% -1.87% 9.46% -1.18% 12.46%
Traits Freckels 14.52% 12.00% 53.06% -1.84% 8.67% 2.66% 12.57%
Age 56..75 32.74% 15.74% 89.29% 31.83% 36.26% -0.65% 23.96%
Partner UTW 32.79% 6.66% 142.35% 7.03% 10.10% -3.35% 33.93%
Morph quality High 41.48% -10.96% 204.59% 11.69% 10.80% -1.52% 34.28%
Traits Moles 44.52% 5.15% 188.27% 43.87% 2.22% 8.99% 18.62%
TABLE 9: Subset EER deviation w.r.t. the overall set of digital images with morphing factor 0.3.
much worse than those related to younger subjects; as per
the Traits subsets (see below) we argue that the transfer of
evident skin characteristics such as wrinkles, freckles or
moles, can make the morphed images similar enough to
both subjects.
• Gender: morphing detection in female subjects looks on
average more difficult.
• Traits: the error rate on images with specific traits (moles,
freckles) is on average higher than that measured on
images without particular facial traits. See the above
discussion on Age.
In general it is interesting to note that some of the tested D-
MADs are quite complementary on some subsets, suggest-
ing that a combination of multiple algorithms could lead to
a general performance improvement.
The results obtained on the P&S Image Benchmark (D-
MAD-SOTAMD P&S-1.0) are summarized in Fig. 8. While
for the best performing approach (DFR) the detection accu-
racy on Digital and P&S images is similar, in general a per-
formance drop on Print and Scan images can be observed;
for example, for the demorphing method (FaDe) the BPCER
values are about 10% higher. Also in this case the influence
of the morphing factor on the MAD performance can be
observed in Table 10 reporting the results for the overall
set of images and for the subsets of images with morphing
factor 0.3 and 0.5.
Fig. 8: DET plot for the D-MAD-SOTAMD P&S-1.0.
6.2 Results - Single-image Morph Attack Detection (S-
MAD)
The results of S-MAD algorithms on printed-scanned
images are given in Table 11 and on digital images in
Table 12 respectively. In this case the overall performance
is quite unsatisfactory in general and very far from the
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 13
Test Bona fide
comparisons
Morphed
comparisons
Algorithm EER BPCER10 BPCER20 BPCER100 REJNBFRA REJNMRA
Overall 10960 55530
BSIF 51.36% 95.66% 98.38% 99.55% 1.35% 1.92%
DFR 4.62% 1.77% 4.08% 19.70% 1.46% 2.11%
MBLBP 29.28% 51.50% 62.38% 81.16% 2.66% 3.56%
WL 36.17% 70.37% 82.75% 95.58% 3.47% 4.19%
DR 50.13% 90.26% 95.37% 99.18% 0.00% 0.00%
FaDe 17.22% 24.82% 32.37% 74.61% 0.16% 0.25%
0.3 10960 18530
BSIF 50.98% 95.60% 98.39% 99.56% 1.35% 1.93%
DFR 2.09% 1.55% 1.55% 12.39% 1.46% 2.13%
MBLBP 27.58% 47.03% 57.72% 75.76% 2.66% 3.63%
WL 31.83% 62.40% 76.43% 93.49% 3.47% 4.26%
DR 50.38% 90.42% 95.64% 99.25% 0.00% 0.00%
FaDe 11.25% 12.74% 20.56% 38.38% 0.16% 0.23%
0.5 10960 37000
BSIF 51.54% 95.67% 98.35% 99.55% 1.35% 1.92%
DFR 5.34% 2.21% 5.60% 23.16% 1.46% 2.09%
MBLBP 30.11% 53.28% 64.63% 83.56% 2.66% 3.53%
WL 38.15% 73.32% 84.90% 96.51% 3.47% 4.15%
DR 49.96% 90.20% 95.22% 99.08% 0.00% 0.00%
FaDe 19.68% 28.55% 38.46% 100.00% 0.16% 0.27%
TABLE 10: Performance indicators measured on the subset of D-MAD-SOTAMD P&S-1.0 benchmark for the overall set of
images and for the subsets of images with morphing factor 0.3 and 0.5.
Test Bona fide
comparisons
Morphed
comparisons
Algorithm EER BPCER10 BPCER20 BPCER100 REJNBFRA REJNMRA
Overall 1096 3703
PRNU 48.04% 85.86% 97.35% 100.00% 0.09% 0.00%
SSE 54.37% 94.89% 98.27% 99.91% 0.00% 0.00%
Deep-S-MAD 37.10% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
S-MBLBP 43.34% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.09% 0.00%
0.3 1096 1853
PRNU 48.49% 86.13% 97.17% 100.00% 0.09% 0.00%
SSE 55.18% 94.89% 98.36% 99.91% 0.00% 0.00%
Deep-S-MAD 38.26% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
S-MBLBP 44.52% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.09% 0.00%
0.5 1096 1850
PRNU 47.29% 85.86% 97.45% 100.00% 0.09% 0.00%
SSE 53.74% 94.80% 97.99% 99.91% 0.00% 0.00%
Deep-S-MAD 35.43% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
S-MBLBP 42.15% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.09% 0.00%
TABLE 11: Performance indicators measured on the subset of S-MAD-SOTAMD P&S-1.0 benchmark for the overall set of
images and for the subsets of images with morphing factor 0.3 and 0.5.
Test Bona fide
comparisons
Morphed
comparisons
Algorithm EER BPCER10 BPCER20 BPCER100 REJNBFRA REJNMRA
Overall 300 2045
PRNU 44.81% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SSE 31.80% 65.00% 79.33% 91.67% 0.00% 0.00%
Deep-S-MAD 38.99% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
S-MBLBP 41.38% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.3 300 1035
PRNU 44.81% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SSE 32.76% 68.00% 81.33% 90.67% 0.00% 0.00%
Deep-S-MAD 39.64% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
S-MBLBP 42.33% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.5 300 1010
PRNU 44.82% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SSE 31.14% 63.33% 77.00% 92.33% 0.00% 0.00%
Deep-S-MAD 38.33% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
S-MBLBP 40.63% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
TABLE 12: Performance indicators measured on the subset of S-MAD-SOTAMD D-1.0 benchmark for the overall set of
images and for the subsets of images with morphing factor 0.3 and 0.5.
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accuracy needed in real operational conditions. No signif-
icant differences can be observed between the different test
cases: morphing factor 0.3 or 0.5, digital or printed-scanned
images. We can conclude that morphing attack detection
based on the analysis of the single image is still very
complex, particularly in the presence of heterogeneous im-
age sources, different processing pipelines and high quality
morphs obtained through a careful selection of subjects and
an accurate post-processing aimed at removing all visible
artifacts. The results confirm again the importance of cross-
database training and testing to improve the robustness of
detection algorithms.
6.3 Directions for Future Works
As noted from the results reported in the previous sec-
tions, it is evident that the accuracy of MAD does not meet
the operational requirements. If we focus on BPCER100, we
can see from Tables 7 and 10 that the result is around 20%
for the best performing D-MAD approach. For all S-MAD
algorithms (see Table 11 and Table 12), BPCER100 is higher
than 90%. From a practical point of view, this behaviour
would cause a considerable number of false alarms. This
would be unacceptable if we consider operational MAD
algorithms that are expected to work at a BPCER1000 with
a value lower than 5%.
• Given the number of covariates impacting the MAD
performance such as age, gender and ethnicity, newer
algorithms need to be developed to address the complex
challenge of morphing attacks.
• As it can also be noted from the Table 10 that the print and
scan process reduces the MAD accuracy to a larger extent.
Newer algorithms need to be developed to improve the
accuracy of the algorithms for detecting morphing attacks
specifically when images are processed through the print
and scan pipeline.
• As a complementary direction, the human detection per-
formance should be studied in a standardized manner
to understand the key factors in spotting the morphing
attacks on FRS.
7 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
Given the complex nature of the morphing attack de-
tection on FRS, we presented a new evaluation framework
and a new database of morphed images in this work. The
morphed dataset being publicly available in a sequestered
manner allows the researchers to benchmark the algorithms
in a continuous manner to contribute to development of
morphing attack detection. Further, this work also provides
a benchmark of the existing state of the art algorithms to
give a clear idea of the limitations in the existing algorithms
for MAD.
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